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Abstract 
Prior research shows grocery stores reduce prices to compete with Walmart Supercenters.  This 
study finds evidence that the competitive effects of two other big box retailers – Costco and 
Walmart-owned Sam's Club – are quite different.  Using city-level panel grocery price data 
matched with a unique data set on Walmart and warehouse club locations, we find that Costco 
entry is associated with higher grocery prices at incumbent retailers, and that the effect is 
strongest in cities with small populations and high grocery store densities.  This is consistent 
with incumbents competing with Costco along non-price dimensions such as product quality or 
quality of the shopping experience.  We find no evidence that Sam’s Club entry affects grocery 
stores’ prices, consistent with Sam’s Club’s focus on small businesses instead of consumers.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Firms do not compete on price and quantity alone.  They also compete by innovating, 
experimenting, and differentiating their products.  In retail, they can compete by changing the 
mix of distribution services and amenities that accompany the goods being offered as well.  This 
paper presents evidence that incumbent grocers charge higher prices in response to competition 
from the discount wholesaler Costco.  This is consistent with incumbents electing not to compete 
on price, and instead focusing on appealing to less price sensitive consumers by offering, for 
instance, higher quality products or a more pleasant shopping experience.  The data suggest that 
Sam’s Club, meanwhile, does not affect grocery store prices.   
Ellickson (2007:45) points out three major changes in grocery retail during the twentieth 
century.  The first was the rise of the chain store in the early 1900s.  The second was the 
introduction and diffusion of the supermarket in the middle of the century.  The third was the 
“adoption of technology-intensive distribution systems in the 1980s and 1990s” (Ellickson 
2007:45).  To this we might add a trend that accelerated in the 1990s: expansion by “big box” 
discounters and wholesalers like Walmart, Costco, and Target into the grocery business.  In 
2010, Supermarket News reported that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. was North America’s largest 
grocery retailer, Kroger was North America’s second-largest, and Costco Wholesale Corp. was 
North America’s third-largest.1  This has increased variety in the grocery business.  Citing data 
from the Food Marketing Institute, Ellickson (2007:522) points out that “the number of products 
offered per store increased from about 14,000 in 1980 to over 30,000 by 2004.”  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. again topped the Fortune 500 in 2010.  Costco—categorized by 
Fortune as a “specialty retailer”—was ranked #25.  Also in the top 50 were big box retailers 
                                                        
1
 “SN’s Top 75 Retailers for 2010.”  http://supermarketnews.com/profiles/top75/2010/index.html/, accessed 
December 30, 2010. 
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Home Depot (#29), Lowe’s (#42), and Best Buy (#45), and general merchandisers Target (#30) 
and Sears Holdings (#48).  2010 revenues for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. were higher than 2010 
revenue for these other firms combined.2 
Motivated by this trend toward nontraditional retail outlets, a growing body of research 
examines the effects of Walmart on a number of outcomes, including prices (Basker 2005b; 
Basker and Noel 2009; Volpe and Lavoie 2007; Hausman and Leibtag 2007, 2009), labor market 
outcomes (Basker 2005a; Hicks 2007; Neumark et al. 2008; Dube et al. 2007; Basker 2006), 
poverty (Goetz and Swaminathan 2006), small business activity (Sobel and Dean 2008), social 
capital (Goetz and Rupasingha 2006; Carden et al. 2009a), leisure activities (Carden and 
Courtemanche 2009), traditional values (Carden et al. 2009b), and obesity (Courtemanche and 
Carden 2011).3  However, to our knowledge no previous research has used nationwide data to 
explore the effects of other big box chains.  We provide a first step toward filling this void.   
Basker (2005a), Volpe and Lavoie (2007), Hausman and Leibtag (2007, 2009), and 
Basker and Noel (2009) present evidence that Walmart discount stores and Supercenters reduce 
market prices, both directly through their price advantages and indirectly through their influence 
on competitors.  The competitive response need not be to reduce prices, however, as retail firms 
also compete on margins like distribution services, assortment, and convenience.  In two papers 
on the structure of grocery retail, Ellickson (2004, 2007) argues that grocery stores compete by 
offering greater variety, which requires investments in distribution centers that increases quality 
by raising fixed costs, but not marginal costs (Ellickson 2004:524).  Incumbents incur larger 
fixed costs to build better distribution networks; according to Ellickson (2004, 2007), this 
                                                        
2
“Fortune 500.”  http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/, accessed December 30, 2010. 
3
 Comprehensive reviews of the literature on Walmart can be found in Basker (2007), Hicks (2007), Carden et al. 
(2009a), and Carden and Courtemanche (2009). 
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explains why larger markets have higher-quality products and greater selection rather than more 
firms.4 
We estimate the effects of Costco and Sam’s Club on grocery prices using a unique 
dataset of warehouse club entry dates and locations matched with city-level panel data on prices 
of a range of items from the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association Cost of 
Living Index (ACCRA COLI).5  The ACCRA COLI does not sample warehouse clubs, so our 
estimates capture the competitive effects of Costco and Sam’s Club on prices charged by 
incumbent grocers in a market.  Controlling for Walmart Supercenters, product-by-year fixed 
effects, city fixed effects, and lagged price, a new Costco increases competitors’ grocery prices 
by a statistically significant 1.4% in the short run and 2.7% in the long run, while the impact of a 
new Sam’s Club is small and insignificant.  The results also provide further evidence that 
Walmart Supercenters reduce grocery prices. 
We conduct a falsification test and a wide range of robustness checks in order to increase 
confidence that the estimates reflect causal effects rather than spurious correlations.  We also 
stratify by product and product type and find that Costco’s effect is somewhat larger for the 
goods for which ACCRA’s data collection process allows product quality to vary across stores.  
We interpret this as preliminary evidence that firms’ responses to Costco entry include some 
competition along the quality dimension.  Finally, we test for heterogeneity on the basis of 
market characteristics and show that Costco has the strongest effects in cities with low 
populations and a large number of grocery stores per capita.  Our results are consistent with the 
findings of Basker (2005a), Volpe and Lavoie (2007), and Basker and Noel (2009) that Walmart 
Supercenters lower prices, Barber and Tietje’s (2004) finding that incumbent firms might raise 
                                                        
4 Ellickson (2004, 2007) notes that there is still a low-price, low-quality fringe in these markets. 
5
 ACCRA is now the Council for Community and Economic Research (www.c2er.org). 
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prices as a strategic response to new entry, and Ellickson’s (2004, 2007) models whereby 
grocery stores compete on the basis of quality and improved distribution networks.  Further, 
these results suggest that Costco might capture price-sensitive shoppers and leave incumbents to 
serve shoppers who are less price sensitive. 
THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
Retail Price Responses to Competitive Pressure 
The market is a process of harmonizing buyers’ and sellers’ plans; under ceteris paribus 
conditions, these plans will coordinate fully until equilibrium is obtained and no one has an 
incentive to change his or her actions (cf. Hayek 1948:41-45).  At issue is whether 
entrepreneurship upsets the process (Schumpeter 1942) or constitutes the process (Kirzner 1973).  
For Schumpeter (1942), the entrepreneur is a dis-equilibrator who changes the underlying pattern 
of preferences, technology, and resources.  For Kirzner (1973), the entrepreneur is an 
equilibrator who adjusts the production process to the underlying pattern of preferences, 
technology, and resources.  Regardless, entrepreneurship and competition are processes of active 
adjustment rather than passive observance and acquiescence to exogenously-changing conditions 
(Klein 2010:54-55). Boudreaux (1994) analyzes the ways in which Schumpeter and Kirzner 
emphasize different aspects of the adjustment process, noting that the Kirznerian entrepreneurial 
function and the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial function are complements, not substitutes. 
Boudreaux (1994: 57) discusses the complementarity specifically: “Whereas Schumpeter 
highlighted those activities that change the givens, Kirzner’s focus is on the activities that 
actually establish equilibrium prices given the particular givens.”6 
                                                        
6
 See Boudreaux (1994:56ff) for a graphical discussion of the complementarity. 
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The things we hold constant under the ceteris paribus conditions that are used to isolate 
and analyze pure price competition are often the very elements of the competitive process that 
are most important (Boudreaux 1994:53, citing Schumpeter 1942:84).  Incumbents’ reactions to 
warehouse club entry illustrate the processes of dis-equilibrating and re-equilibrating competition 
along the margins that make up the retail offer.  In this case, we observe dis-equilibrating entry 
by large-scale retailers like Walmart and Costco.  The price effects that we observe over the long 
run represent the re-equilibrating responses of incumbents who have to innovate in response to 
competitors’ entry.   
Our finding that neither Costco nor Sam’s Club reduces competitors’ prices – and in fact 
that Costco increases them – might be surprising in light of evidence on the price effects of 
Walmart discount stores and Supercenters.  Basker (2005a), Hausman and Leibtag (2007, 2009), 
and Basker and Noel (2009) have shown not only that retailers like Walmart sell goods at 
considerable discounts, but also that incumbent retailers reduce their prices when faced with 
competition from new Walmart stores. Matsa (2011) finds that competitors tend to have fewer 
inventory shortfalls in response to Walmart’s competition, and non-price margins like quality 
might be the most important aspects of the Costco effect. 
 The theoretical effect of new competitive pressure on retail prices is ambiguous because 
the retail offer is multi-dimensional.  When consumers are deciding whether to buy something 
from a particular retailer, they are evaluating a bundle that includes a good, a level of service, a 
location, assortment and variety, a shopping ambiance, and a degree of risk regarding whether 
the store will have what the shopper seeks.  The good is the only part of the mix that is priced 
explicitly.  Other aspects of the retail offer are priced implicitly. 
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Models of the economics of retail are summarized by Betancourt (2004).  Retailers face 
the following inverse demand function, adapted from Betancourt (2004:23): 
 = ,  , 	,
																																																																					1 
where P is price, Q is quantity, D is a vector of distribution services, W is consumer income, and 
P’ is a vector of other prices that might affect the market for (say) bread.  Price is non-increasing 
in Q and non-decreasing in the elements of D and W; its relationship to Pi’ is ambiguous a priori.  
In a market where there are n competitors, firm i will face an inverse demand function in which 
its price is also a function of the quantities, distribution services, and prices offered by potential 
competitors: 
 = ,  , 	,
;  ,  ,  , 	; … ; , , , 																																				2 
More fully, every aspect of a firm’s offer will change in response to competing firms’ 
decisions regarding price, quantity, distribution services, and the prices of other goods, yielding 
the following general inverse demand function: 
 =   , ,  , 
	; … ; , , , 	,  ,  ,  , 	; … ; , , , 	,	 , ,  , 	; … ; , , , 	,
;  , ,  , 	; … ; , , , 	 							3 
The direct effects of competitors’ decisions on a firm’s prices might be straightforward: 
all else equal, a firm will compete by lowering price in response to a competitor’s improved 
service, ambiance, or other amenities.  The sensitivity of the other components of the retail offer 
to competitors’ decisions, though, means that the effect of entry on observed prices will be 
ambiguous a priori.  Super Walmart, which specializes in low prices and low amenities, will 
generate a different response than will a retailer like Whole Foods Market that specializes in high 
amenities and selection of natural and organic products.  Similarly, Costco might offer a bundle 
of prices and distribution services that induces incumbents to make price-increasing changes to 
their operations, Super Walmart might offer a bundle of prices and distribution services that 
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induces incumbents to make price-reducing changes to their operations, and Sam’s Club might 
offer a bundle or prices and distribution services that leaves incumbents’ prices unchanged.  
Costco, for example, might capture price-sensitive consumers who are willing to drive longer 
distances for a less pleasant shopping experience in order to obtain deep discounts.  In this case, 
we would expect to see prices rise among incumbent grocers as they lose shoppers who are more 
price-sensitive and serve shoppers who are less price-sensitive. 
According to Ellickson (2004, 2007), large grocery chains compete on the basis of 
quality and variety, which requires substantial fixed investments in retail services.  This is also 
consistent with Hollander’s (1960:37) discussion of “the wheel of retailing,” whereby “new 
types of retailing frequently start off with crude facilities, little prestige, and a reputation for 
cutting prices and margins.7  As they mature, they often acquire more expensive buildings, 
provide more elaborate services, impose higher margins, and become vulnerable to new 
competition.”  Hollander describes this as “a ratchet process” through which “merchants in any 
established branch of trade tend to provide increasingly elaborate services at increasingly higher 
margins” (Hollander 1960:38).  As firms move along the wheel toward “increasingly elaborate 
services,” they provide incentives for innovators and entrepreneurs to introduce newer retail 
forms.  Innovators and entrepreneurs introducing new retail forms in turn put pressure on 
incumbents to provide higher-quality services in order to stay competitive. 
Price Effects of Big Box Retailers 
 
Hausman and Leibtag (2007) examine a basket of 20 food items and find that prices at 
supercenters, mass merchandisers, and club stores (which include Costco and Sam’s Club) are 
5%-48% lower than prices at conventional retailers such as supermarkets.  Walmart’s food prices 
                                                        
7
 We thank John Planchon for directing us to this work. 
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are lower by 8-27% according to data from studies discussed by Hausman and Leibtag (2009).  
They argue that Walmart’s effect on prices is so large that the Consumer Price Index is biased 
upward by failing to account for its presence.  Membership fee warehouses are an exercise in 
two-part tariff price discrimination, but entry by a warehouse club like Sam’s Club or Costco 
also introduces a new brand of competition into the marketplace.  If, as Hausman and Leibtag 
(2009) argue, the opportunity to shop at Walmart should be considered a new good by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, this is perhaps doubly true for warehouse clubs like Sam’s Club and 
Costco. 
Volpe and Lavoie (2007) report that Walmart Supercenters have a distinct price 
advantage over both stores that compete with them directly (other stores within a five-mile 
radius) and comparison stores with whom they do not compete directly (stores outside that five-
mile radius).  Using data on 54 goods collected at 18 stores in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut, they show that the average price of a thirty-good basket of national brand goods is 
$82.94 at the comparison stores, $76.04 at the competing stores, and $59.38 at Walmart 
Supercenters.  A 24-item basket of private-label goods is $50.99 at comparison stores, $46.73 at 
competing stores, and $33.99 at Walmart Supercenters.  Also relevant for our study is their 
observation that competition with Walmart occurs across a variety of dimensions, with 
“(n)onprice strategies includ(ing) improving service, image, or variety” (Volpe and Lavoie 
2007:10). 
Using ACCRA COLI data from 1982-2002, Basker (2005) estimates the effect of 
Walmart on the market prices of ten non-food items such as shampoo, toothpaste, and laundry 
detergent.  She finds that Walmart entry generally reduces prices by 1.5%-3% in the short run 
and about four times as much in the long run.  She notes that the ACCRA data do include some 
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Walmart stores, so her estimates represent weighted averages of Walmart’s price advantage and 
its effect on competitors’ prices. 
The paper most closely related to ours is Basker and Noel (2009), who use 2001-2004 
ACCRA COLI data to show that entry by a Walmart Supercenter drives down prices among 
competing grocery stores.  They use a more limited range of years than Basker (2005) because 
for 2001-2004 they are able to determine the identity of the sampled stores, allowing them to 
exclude Walmart stores from the price computations and thereby isolate Walmart’s effect on 
competitors.  Pooling prices from 24 grocery items, they estimate that an additional Walmart 
Supercenter in a city reduce prices at incumbent retailers by 1-1.2%, with the largest changes 
occurring among smaller and lower-end grocers. 
While credible estimates of the price effects of Walmart and Walmart Supercenters are 
therefore beginning to emerge, little is known about the effects of other big box chains.8  
Warehouse clubs, which offer steep discounts on goods purchased in bulk to customers who pay 
a small membership fee, represent a fundamental change in shopping technology and could 
plausibly have even more dramatic effects on competitors’ prices than Walmart.  On the other 
hand, incumbents could decide that warehouse clubs’ price advantages are so large that 
competition along the price dimension is futile, leading them to compete by providing higher-end 
products or shopping experiences and raising prices. 
Sam’s Club and Costco: Differences 
Warehouse clubs are important because they represent another step in a series of changes 
in shopping technology.  The key differences between mass merchandisers like Walmart and 
grocery stores is that stores like Walmart carry more product categories with less variation within 
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 In one study, Barber and Tietje (2004) studied entry by a Home Depot and found that one of the incumbent 
hardware stores raised prices on some of its goods in response.  This paper is discussed by Betancourt (2004:36ff). 
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each category (Fox et al. 2004:S36).  This is even truer for warehouse clubs.  In contrast to 
conventional supermarkets and mass merchandisers, they carry a relatively limited selection of 
name-brand or house-brand goods (e.g. Member’s Mark at Sam’s Club and Kirkland’s at 
Costco).  Supermarkets tend at times to carry brands in great variety while superstores tend to 
carry brands in more limited varieties.  Warehouse clubs are more likely to carry an even less 
diversified product line: they may carry only one brand of spaghetti sauce, for example.9 
While all warehouse clubs share these general features, notable distinctions exist within 
the warehouse club category.  In particular, the two leading chains – Sam’s Club and Costco – 
differ with respect to their customer base.10  Sam’s Club has historically targeted small 
businesses, as evidenced by their former slogan “We’re in Business for Small Business”, while 
Costco has focused more heavily on individual consumers.  According to their 2009 10k form, 
Wal-Mart’s “focus for Sam’s Club is to provide exceptional value on brand-name merchandise at 
‘members only’ prices for both business and personal use” (p. 3).  Costco, by contrast, 
“operate[s] membership warehouses based on the concept that offering our members low prices 
on a limited selection of nationally branded and selected private-label products in a wide range 
of merchandise categories will produce high sales volumes and rapid inventory turnover” 
(Costco 2009 10-K, p. 3).  The different focuses are also evident in Walmart’s 2009 annual 
report, which devotes a paragraph to Sam’s Club’s focus on supplying small businesses.11 
According to the store’s website, Sam’s offers Advantage Membership, Advantage Plus 
membership (which offers access to more discounts and greater cash back rewards on the 
affiliated credit card), Business Membership, and Business Plus membership.  According to 
                                                        
9
 Bates (1977 [2002]) offers an early discussion of the warehouse club format. 
10
 BJ’s Wholesale Club, which operates primarily on the east coast, is another important player in the warehouse 
club market.  For reasons discussed in the data section, we do not include BJ’s in our empirical analysis and 
therefore do not discuss it here either.  
11 http://walmartstores.com/sites/AnnualReport/2009/sams_club.html, accessed July 14, 2010. 
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Costco’s website, one can be a Gold Star Member, a Business Member, or an Executive 
Member.  Business membership and Gold Star membership both cost $50 while Executive 
membership costs $100.  At Sam’s Club, Business membership costs $35, Advantage 
membership costs $40, and both of the “plus” memberships cost $100 as of mid-2010.12  Sam’s 
offers extended hours for business members, while Costco does not.13  Sam’s Club also offers 
detailed services for small businesses on a dedicated website.14 
 Table 1 compares Costco and Sam’s Club sales by category for 2009.  The categories are 
not strictly comparable as the two stores use slightly different terminology and slightly different 
definitions.  For Costco, for example, “Food” is the sum of their category “Food” (21%), which 
is defined as “including dry and institutionally packaged foods,” and their category “Fresh Food” 
(12%), which is defined as “including meat, bakery, deli, and produce.”  Sam’s Club defines 
their category “Food” as “including dairy, meat, bakery, deli, produce, dry, chilled, and frozen 
packaged foods.”15  The data should be interpreted with caution, but they suggest that Sam’s 
Club gets a much greater percentage of its sales from “Sundries,” which it defines as “including 
snack foods, tobacco, alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, paper goods, laundry and home care 
and other consumables” and which Costco defines as “including candy, snack foods, tobacco, 
alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages and cleaning and institutional supplies.”  Hardlines and 
softlines—called “hardgoods” and “softgoods” for Sam’s Club—provide a greater percentage of 
                                                        
12
 Information found at https://www.samsclub.com/sams/checkout/membership/purchaseMembership.jsp and 
http://shop.costco.com/membership/join-costco, both accessed July 14, 2010. 
13
 Anecdotal evidence—a conversation with a store associate at the customer service desk at Sam’s Club—also 
supports the notion that Sam’s Club caters mostly to small businesses while Costco caters mostly to families.   
14 http://www3.samsclub.com/smallbusiness, accessed December 31, 2010. 
15
 The fact that Costco includes a separate category for “Fresh Food” suggests a different clientele.  In an informal 
conversation between one of the authors and an employee at one of the stores, the associate said that Sam’s Club 
serves small businesses while Costco’s target customers are middle-class families.   An employee of a store that 
competes with both Sam’s Club and Costco pointed out that store design, convenience, and customer service are 
important elements of his firm’s competitive strategy.  Finally, an example is also suggestive.  A friend of one of the 
authors once asked his six-year-old son where he wanted to go for breakfast after church.  The child’s reply: 
“Costco.” 
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Costco’s sales than Sam’s Club’s.  Costco’s hardline goods “includ[e] major appliances, 
electronics, health and beauty aids, hardware, office supplies, garden and patio, sporting goods, 
furniture, and automotive supplies” while Sam’s Club’s hardgoods “includ[e] home 
improvement, electronics, office supplies, outdoor living, grills, gardening, and furniture.”  
Costco’s softlines “includ[e] apparel, domestics, jewelry, housewares, media, home furnishings, 
cameras, and small appliances” while Sam’s Club’s “softgoods” includ[e] apparel, jewelry, 
housewares, mattresses, and small appliances.” 
DATA 
Following Basker (2005b) and Basker and Noel (2009), we use price data from the 
Council for Community and Economic Research’s (C2ER) ACCRA COLI.  Through local 
chambers of commerce, the ACCRA COLI computes quarterly market prices for a wide range of 
grocery, energy, transportation, housing, health care, and other items by surveying retailers in 
between 274 and 334 small geographic areas.  For simplicity, we refer to each area as a “city” 
throughout the rest of the paper, although some are actually multiple cities (i.e. Barre-
Montpelier, VT) or entire counties.  As a robustness check we later show that the results are not 
sensitive to dropping the multiple cities and counties from the sample. 
We examine the effects of Costco, Sam’s Club, and Walmart Supercenter on the prices of 
the 23 grocery items the ACCRA COLI reported consistently during our sample period.  These 
products, which we describe in Table 2, span a variety of different categories: starches, fruits and 
vegetables, meats, beverages, additives, and non-food items.  We also conduct a falsification 
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exercise that tests for “effects” of these stores on the prices of 9 non-grocery items described in 
Table 3 that big box retailers do not typically sell.16 
Whether warehouse clubs and Supercenters are among the stores surveyed in the ACCRA 
COLI is critical to the interpretation of the results.  As noted by Basker and Noel (2009:982), the 
sampling instructions specifically excluded membership clubs such as Costco and Sam’s Club, 
so any estimated effect of these stores represents a response by competing grocers.  The 
instructions also discouraged the inclusion of Walmart Supercenters, saying that discount 
retailers should not be sampled “unless upper-income professionals and executives really shop 
there” (ACCRA 2000:1.3).  However, Basker and Noel (2009:982) report that 14% of grocery 
prices were nonetheless collected at Supercenters.  Our estimated effect of Supercenters 
therefore represents a weighted average of their price advantage and their effect on competitors.  
Both because interpretation of the results is less clear for Supercenters and because prior research 
has already estimated Supercenters’ competitive effects, we emphasize the results for Costco and 
Sam’s Club in this paper.  Including Supercenters as a control variable is still critical, however, 
since Sam’s Clubs and Walmarts are often located together.  
We merge the ACCRA COLI price data with a newly-constructed database of big box 
retailer and distribution center locations.  Costco, Sam’s Club, and BJ’s Wholesale Club data 
through May of 2003 were collected by Austan Goolsbee and Chad Syverson and generously 
shared by Chad Syverson.  We updated these warehouse club data through the end of 2008 using 
the store locators on Costco.com and bjs.com, along with Sam’s Club opening dates since 2003 
provided by Walmart Stores, Inc.  We assembled Costco, Sam’s Club, and BJ’s Wholesale Club 
                                                        
16
 Note that some warehouse clubs have tire and auto centers while Walmart Supercenters increasingly have hair 
salons, so the falsification tests are perhaps not perfect for these particular items.  Excluding them does not, 
however, affect our results.  Note also that we do not use the energy and housing prices in the falsification analysis 
as they are less obviously comparable to grocery prices than the prices for the other non-grocery items.  Including 
them also does not affect the results. 
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distribution center locations and opening years by first searching Google Maps to find the 
locations, and then contacting the distribution centers and local chambers of commerce to 
determine entry years.  Though our database therefore contains all three leading warehouse club 
chains, we do not use the BJ’s Wholesale Club information in this paper since only one of the 
cities in our matched sample experienced BJ’s Wholesale Club entry during the sample period.  
Walmart Supercenter, discount store, distribution center, and food distribution center entry dates 
and locations through January of 2006 were graciously provided online by Thomas Holmes and 
used in Holmes (2008).17  We updated these Walmart data through the end of 2007 using the 
store locators on Walmart.com along with press releases containing store and distribution center 
opening dates.   
We also include other city- and county-level characteristics as controls in some 
regressions.  City population and land area from 2000 and median household income from 1999 
come from the U.S. Census Bureau, accessed via Statistical Warehouse.  The number of grocery 
stores and warehouse clubs or supercenters besides our stores of interest in each county 
(comparable city-level data are not available) are taken from the 1992, 1997, and 2002 Censuses 
of Retail Trade and imputed for the remaining years through linear interpolations and 
extrapolations. 
 We construct our sample by matching the annual store, distribution center, and control 
variables to fourth quarter ACCRA prices from 1994 to 2006.  We use only one quarter per year 
as for some stores and distribution centers we know the year but not the month of entry.  Given 
this limitation, the fourth quarter is the most natural choice in order to maximize the probability 
that new stores in a particular year open before the prices are recorded.  As a robustness check 
we later show the results are similar if we instead match first quarter prices to store locations 
                                                        
17
 See http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/WalMart/index.html. 
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from the end of the previous year.  We exclude years before 1994 because in 1993 Costco 
merged with Price Club while Walmart acquired PACE Wholesale Club; a large number of 
Costcos and Sam’s Clubs therefore opened in 1993 and 1994 that were not actually new 
warehouse clubs.  The ACCRA COLI cities varied somewhat over time; we include the 289 
cities surveyed in over half of the 13 years.  Our sample consists of 70,604 product-city-year-
level observations for the main analysis and 27,657 for the falsification exercise.   
Tables 2-4 present the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis.  The sample mean grocery item price is $2.37, with average prices for the individual 
products ranging from $0.59 per pound of bananas to $7.99 per pound of T-bone steak.  The 
average sample city has 0.2 Costcos, 0.7 Sam’s Clubs, and 0.7 Walmart Supercenters and a 
population of about 200,000. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our empirical analysis proceeds as follows.  We begin by estimating the average effects 
of Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and Supercenters on the price of grocery items.  Motivated by 
approaches used in the literature, we develop a baseline fixed effects model that we validate 
through a falsification test.  We then evaluate the sensitivity of our baseline results through a 
wide range of robustness checks.  Next, we examine the timing of the effect by including leads 
and lags, the former of which provides an additional test for endogeneity bias.  Finally, we 
explore the possibility of heterogeneity on the bases of product and market characteristics. 
Baseline Model and Falsification Test 
Basker and Noel (2009) estimate the effect of Walmart Supercenter entry on competitors’ 
grocery prices using ACCRA COLI data from the third quarters of 2001-2004.  Their preferred 
specification regresses the natural log of price on the number of Walmart Supercenters in the city 
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along with city and product-by-year fixed effects.  They also estimate cross-sectional, long 
difference, and (in their appendix) instrumental variables models, but they favor the fixed effects 
specification based on its utilization of all available information and its passage of a falsification 
test.  Our baseline model adopts Basker and Noel’s (2009) fixed effects approach but adds 
Costco, Sam’s Club, and the annual lag of the log of price.  We include lagged price because 
Basker (2005b) documented the stickiness of price shocks in her earlier analysis of the effect of 
Walmart on ACCRA COLI prices; presumably Basker and Noel (2009) did not also include 
lagged price because of the short duration of their panel.  Our regression equation is 
 =  +  !"  + #!$%! + &!'% + (,) +*+,"-

 
+*./ 01"2

+ 3.																																																																																								4 
where  is the price (in 2006 dollars) of product i in city c in year t;  !" , !$%!, and 
!'% indicate the number of Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and Walmart Supercenters in city c in year 
t; ,) is the lagged product price; and the summation terms reflect city fixed effects and 
product-by-year fixed effects.  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and adjusted for 
clustering at the city level.18 
 The dynamic model (4) allows for the estimation of both short- and long-run effects.  The 
short run effects of Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and Supercenters are given by , #, and &.  
Computing long-run effects requires considering that a store that entered prior to the current year 
impacts contemporaneous price not only through contemporaneous number of stores but also 
                                                        
18 OLS coefficient estimators in models with lagged dependent variables can be inconsistent if the errors are 
serially correlated (Keele and Kelly 2006).  We tested for serial correlation by compressing the data into a 
two-dimensional panel by computing average product prices in each city in each year, running an analogous 
regression to equation (4), and then performing the Arrelano-Bond test using the Stata module “abar” 
(Roodman 2004).  The test found only weak evidence of first-order autocorrelation (significant at only the 
5% level despite the large sample size).  When the extent of the autocorrelation is small, the bias is negligible 
in large samples (Keele and Kelly 2006).  We therefore estimate the model using OLS, and later conduct 
robustness checks to rule out the possibility that serial correlation is driving our conclusions.    
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through lagged price.  If, for instance, a new Costco enters, the immediate effect on price is , 
the additional effect the following year is (, the additional effect the year after is (#, then 
(&, and so on.  The total long-run effect of Costco is therefore given by the following 
geometric series: 
*(
6
7
= 1 − (																																																																	5 
The long-run effects of Sam’s Club and Walmart Supercenter can also be computed by replacing 
 with # and &.19 
The key identifying assumption in regression equation (4) is that changes over time in 
unobservable city-level characteristics affecting prices are uncorrelated with changes in Costco, 
Sam’s Club, and Supercenter presence.  This assumption would be violated if, for instance, a 
positive demand shock both increases a city’s grocery prices and makes it more attractive to big 
box retailers.  Basker and Noel (2009) provide evidence to support the strict exogeneity 
assumption in fixed effects regressions with Supercenters from 2001-2004, but it is not clear that 
this generalizes to regressions with three stores and a longer time period.  We therefore conduct a 
falsification test where we re-estimate equation (4) using non-grocery instead of grocery prices 
as the dependent variable.  Since Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and Supercenters generally do not sell 
substitutes for the non-grocery items, a finding that any of these stores “affect” the prices of non-
grocery items could be attributed to endogeneity bias, thereby calling into question the ability of 
the model to reveal causal effects on grocery prices.   
We report the results for the baseline regression and falsification test in Tables 5.  A new 
Costco is associated with a statistically significant increase in grocery prices of 1.4% in the short 
                                                        
19
 See Basker (2005b) for further discussion of the derivation of long-run effects in this context. 
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run and 2.7% in the long run.  The effect of Sam’s Club, however, is small and insignificant.  
Walmart Supercenters reduce prices by a statistically significant 0.9% in the short run and 1.7% 
in the long run.  Our Supercenter estimates are in line with those obtained by Basker and Noel 
(2009).  We take this as evidence that, even though our ACCRA COLI data do not allow for the 
exclusion of Walmarts from the stores used to compute market prices, our estimates for 
Supercenters mostly reflect a competitive effect rather than Walmart’s price advantage.  
Importantly, the falsification test estimates small and insignificant effects of all three stores, 
providing preliminary evidence to support the baseline model.  We next further test the validity 
of this specification by subjecting it to a number of robustness checks.    
Robustness Checks 
In this section we evaluate the sensitivity of the results from our preferred regression.  
Our robustness checks fall into five categories: additional control variables, alternate 
specifications for the store variables, other methods of sample construction, longer lags of price, 
and instrumental variables. 
In Panel A of Table 6 we report the results from re-estimating equation (4) including four 
different sets of control variables.  First, we add interactions of each of the year fixed effects 
with city population.  This addresses potential endogeneity bias from highly populated cities both 
experiencing differential price shocks and being more (or less) likely to attract big box retailers.  
Next, we add interactions of the year fixed effects with median city income to capture 
differential trends in price between high and low income areas.  Third, we control for the county-
level numbers of grocery stores and warehouse clubs or supercenters (besides our stores of 
interest) to help verify that our estimates reflect the effects of Costco, Sam’s Club, and Walmart 
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rather than overall retail structure.20  This also addresses the possibility that the effects may be 
partly due to grocers going out of business when faced with competition from big box retailers.  
Finally, we consider a more general approach to modeling differential trends by including city-
specific time trends, created by interacting each of the city fixed effects with linear year.  In all 
four regressions, the estimated short- and long-run effects for each of the three stores remain 
virtually identical. 
Panel B presents results from various alternative specifications for the Costco, Sam’s 
Club, and Supercenter variables.  These include the number of stores per 100,000 residents or 
100 square miles in the city, binary variables reflecting the presence of at least one store in the 
city, and the number of stores in the county rather than the city.  The first three reflect other 
measures used in the Walmart literature, while the fourth could potentially alter the results to the 
extent that big box retailers in outlying parts of a county draw customers away from grocery 
stores within the city limits.  As shown in the summary statistics in Table 4, the distributions for 
the store variables vary considerably depending on which specification is used, so the coefficient 
estimates are not comparable to those from the baseline model.  However, we observe the same 
general pattern regarding signs and significance.  Costcos consistently increase grocery prices, 
while Walmart Supercenters consistently reduce them.  The effect of Sam’s Club remains small 
and statistically significant in the first three rows of Panel B.  Using the county-level market 
definition, Sam’s Clubs appear at first to increase prices – however, as we show in the next row 
this association disappears if county-specific time trends are added. 
                                                        
20
 In unreported regressions, we also added the number of Walmart discount stores to the model.  Walmart discount 
stores do not contain a full grocery section but do sell a limited range of (typically processed) foods, so it is 
conceivable that they could affect market prices for some grocery items.  We found it difficult to jointly identify the 
effects of discount stores and Walmart Supercenters, as the vast majority of changes in discount store presence in 
our sample reflected a conversion from a discount store to a Supercenter rather than a new discount store.  We 
therefore do not report the results, though the estimates for Costco and Sam’s Club remain similar.   
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 In Panel C, we show that the results are also robust to different sample construction rules.  
Recall that cities move in and out of the ACCRA COLI sample over time, and that we use an 
unbalanced panel of the cities included in over half of the sample years.  In the first row, we 
restrict the sample to those cities present in every year.  This eliminates almost 2/3 of the sample 
and therefore increases the standard errors, but the coefficient estimates remain similar.  The next 
two robustness checks drop the multiple cities and counties from the sample and use the first 
quarter of the following year (1995-2007) rather than the fourth quarter of the current year 
(1994-2006).  Finally, we consider a more drastic change to the sample: instead of pooling the 
products, we compress the available information into one observation per city per year by 
computing both simple and weighted (by the shares given in the ACCRA COLI) average prices 
for the basket of grocery items.  In all cases, the point estimates remain virtually identical. 
 The first three regressions reported in Panel D replace the lagged grocery price variable 
with longer lags of 2, 3, and 4 years and show that the results remain similar.  These robustness 
checks address the concerns that serial correlation in the error term or measurement error in the 
price data may bias the coefficient estimator for lagged price, and that some of the bias could 
spill over into the coefficient estimators for the store variables.  The correlation between 
unobservables that affect contemporaneous and lagged price should weaken with longer lags, so 
the fact that the results are not sensitive to lag length helps to alleviate this concern.  The fourth 
row of Panel D drops lagged price completely.  In this specification, the estimated short- and 
long-run effects are constrained to be the same and are represented by the coefficient estimates.  
Dropping lagged price does not affect the conclusions reached.  
 We close this section by considering an entirely different identification strategy.  Instead 
of attempting to control for the sources of endogeneity bias through city fixed effects, we attempt 
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to purge the bias by using distance from the nearest Costco, Sam’s Club, and Walmart food 
distribution centers (and their squares) as instruments for the three endogenous variables.21 
Distance to the nearest distribution center affects operating costs and therefore provides a source 
of variation in a city’s store presence that is potentially uncorrelated with demand-side 
characteristics influencing price levels.  A concern with this approach, however, is that 
distribution center and store presence may be jointly determined – a corporation may decide to 
open a series of stores in a potentially profitable area along with a distribution center to service 
those stores.  Another limitation is that there is not enough variation over time in cities’ distances 
from distribution centers for the IV estimates to be meaningfully precise in models with city 
fixed effects; we therefore do not include fixed effects in the reported IV regressions.  Because 
of these limitations, we prefer to use the IV analysis as a supplemental robustness check rather 
than as our main approach. 
 Panel E reports the IV results, with the F statistics from tests of the joint significance of 
the instruments in the first-stage regressions in brackets.  The second row adds population, 
population density, and median income as controls in an attempt to compensate somewhat for the 
lack of city fixed effects.  In both regressions, the usual pattern emerges: Costcos significantly 
increase grocery prices, Supercenters significantly decrease them, and Sam’s Clubs have no 
statistically detectable effect.  The estimates for Costcos and Supercenters are larger than in the 
baseline regressions, though adding the control variables attenuates them slightly.  The IV 
estimators do not perform as well as the baseline fixed effects estimators in falsification tests, 
however, so we consider the fixed effects results more reliable.  Specifically, if we estimate the 
IV model with controls using non-grocery prices as the dependent variable, Costco’s short-run 
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 We considered a number of functional forms and the quadratic specification maximized the first-stage F statistics.  
The conclusions reached are generally not sensitive to the functional form used. 
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“effect” is a significant 1.5%.  The difference between Costco’s short-run impacts on grocery 
and non-grocery prices – which is perhaps better reflective of its true causal effect – is therefore 
1.9%, well within the 95% confidence interval from our preferred fixed effects specification. 
Timing 
 We next examine timing by adding leads and lags of the three stores.  A finding that 
lagged Costco, Sam’s Club, and Supercenter presence impact grocery prices conditional on 
current presence of these stores and lagged grocery prices would provide evidence that the 
timing of the effect is less smooth than the relationship given by equation (5).  If the leads of 
Costco, Sam’s Club, and Supercenters impact grocery prices and cause the estimated effects of 
contemporaneous stores to change, this would suggest the associations estimated in the 
preceding sections do not reflect causal effects – price levels are likely determining store entry 
instead of the other way around. 
 Table 7 presents results from regressions including one, two, or three year lags of each of 
the three stores, while Table 8 includes one, two, or three year leads.  In unreported regressions 
we verified the conclusions reached are similar with longer lags or leads or with lags and leads 
included together.  We find no evidence that the results from the preceding sections either mis-
specify the timing of the effect or reflect reverse causality.  The lags for Costco, Sam’s Club, and 
Supercenters are statistically insignificant in all cases and including them has little effect on the 
coefficient estimates for contemporaneous stores.  The leads of Costco presence are insignificant 
and make virtually no difference in the estimate for current Costco presence.  The leads for 
Sam’s Clubs are significant in two regressions, but in all cases the conclusion of a small and 
statistically insignificant association between contemporaneous Sam’s Clubs and grocery prices 
persists.  Future Supercenters are weakly significant in one of the three regressions and 
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insignificant in the other two, while in all three the estimated effect of current Supercenters 
remains similar. 
Heterogeneity by Product 
 All regressions to this point have assumed the impacts of Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and 
Supercenters are the same across different products and markets.  We relax this assumption in 
the final two sections of the empirical analysis, by examining first whether the effects are 
different for different products and then whether they depend on the size and retail landscape of 
the market. 
 We begin by stratifying the sample into product categories.  First we split the sample into 
six categories representing starches, fruits/vegetables, meats, drinks, food additives, and non-
food items, as classified in Table 2.  We next divide the sample into products for which the 
ACCRA COLI specifies the brand to be sampled (cereal, peas, peaches, sausage, tuna, coffee, 
soft drink, shortening, parmesan cheese, margarine, tissue, and dishwasher detergent) and those 
for which it does not (bread, lettuce, bananas, potatoes, corn, steak, beef, chicken, eggs, milk, 
and sugar).  This categorization could potentially help explain the finding that competitors 
compete with Costco by raising prices instead of lowering them: if grocery stores respond to 
Costco entry by offering higher quality products, the price increase should be stronger among 
products for which the brand is not specified and therefore quality is not fixed.   
 Table 9 presents the results.  In all eight categories, Costco increases prices, Supercenters 
decrease prices, and Sam’s Club has no statistically detectable effect.  There are, however, some 
important differences in the magnitudes.  Costco’s effect is strongest for fruits/vegetables, meats, 
and drinks, while Supercenters’ effects are strongest for starches and fruits/vegetables.  Costco 
leads to slightly greater price increases for items where the brand is not specified, although a 
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positive effect remains even when the brand is specified.  These results suggest that competition 
along the product quality dimension explains some but far from all of Costco’s effect. 
 Table 10 stratifies on a finer level and presents regression results for each of the products 
separately.  Though these estimates are relatively imprecise because of the small sample size, 
some interesting findings emerge.  Costco’s largest effect is on lettuce – an item where quality is 
especially variable – and it is also significant in the regressions for peas, corn, beef, eggs, tuna, 
coffee, soft drinks, milk, sugar, parmesan, and detergent.  Though Sam’s Club is insignificant for 
most products, consistent with the pooled results, it does lead to large and significant increases in 
the prices of potatoes and beef and a significant decrease in the price of shortening.  Supercenters 
are statistically significant in every regression but lead to the largest price reductions (2% or 
more in the short run) for bread, potatoes, and corn. 
Heterogeneity by Market Characteristics 
 We close our analysis by examining if the effects of new Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and 
Supercenters differ depending on how many of them are already in the city, the city’s population, 
or the number of grocery stores in the county per 100,000 residents.  The competitive effect of 
Costco entry, for instance, may weaken with the number of Costcos already in the market if the 
new store steals business from existing Costcos as well as competing grocery stores.  Additional 
warehouse clubs or Supercenters might also exert less competitive pressure in large cities where 
they represent a smaller shock to the market.  Finally, big box retailers could have either stronger 
or weaker competitive effects in cities with high grocery store densities.  On one hand, grocery 
stores in underserved areas may not need to make significant changes after warehouse clubs or 
Supercenters enter in order to continue earning comfortable margins.  In this case, the 
competitive effect would increase with grocery store density.  Alternatively, in fiercely 
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competitive markets grocers may already be doing everything they can to differentiate products 
and target particular types of consumers, in which case the competitive effect would decrease 
with grocery store density.  
 We test for nonlinearity in the effects of Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and Supercenters by re-
estimating our baseline regression (4) adding the squares of the three stores.  In Table 11 we use 
these estimates to predict the effects of the first, second, third, and fourth stores to enter the 
average city.  (We stop at four as that is the maximum number of Costcos in our sample.)  We 
also report the coefficient estimates in the table notes.  Costcos have a relatively constant effect 
across the distribution, while the price reductions from Supercenters become weaker with each 
store.  The first Sam’s Club to enter a city leads to a small and marginally significant increase in 
prices, with further stores having no statistically detectable effect. 
 We test for heterogeneity on the basis of population by adding interactions of each store 
with city population to equation (4) and obtaining new estimates.  Based on these estimates, we 
plot in Figures 1-3 the short- and long-run effects of Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and Supercenters on 
prices across the population distribution (up to approximately the 95th percentile of 1,000,000).  
On each figure, the thick solid line represents the estimated short-run effect and the thin solid 
lines represent the upper and lower bounds of its 95% confidence interval. Similarly, the thick 
dashed line shows the estimated long-run effect while the thin dashed lines give the upper and 
lower bounds of its 95% confidence interval.  Figure 1 shows that Costco increases competitors’ 
prices most sharply in less populated areas.  In the smallest cities Costco increases prices by 
about 1.5% in the short run and 2.8% in the long run.  This effect gradually diminishes as 
population increases, eventually becoming statistically insignificant at a population of about 
350,000.  In Figure 2, the impact of Sam’s Club appears to slightly rise across the population 
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distribution, but at no point is either the short- or long-run effect statistically different from zero.  
Figure 3 shows that competitors in the smallest cities reduce prices by 1.3% in the short run and 
2.5% in the long run in response to Supercenter entry.  The effect diminishes as city population 
increases but remains significant throughout most of the distribution. 
 Finally, we examine heterogeneity on the basis of grocery store density by adding 
grocery stores per 100,000 residents as well as its interaction with each of the three store 
variables to regression equation (4).  We display the results (up to the 95th percentile of 130 
grocery stores per 100,000 residents) in Figures 4-6.  Figure 4 shows that grocers increase prices 
more dramatically when Costco enters markets that are already saturated with grocery stores.  
The short and long run effects both become significant at about 28 grocery stores and level off at 
1.8% and 3.4%, respectively, at over 100 grocery stores.  The impact of Sam’s Club also 
increases with grocery store density, as shown in Figure 5, but is never significant in either the 
short or long run.  Figure 6 shows that Supercenters’ competitive effects also strengthen in more 
saturated markets, becoming significant at just over 20 grocery stores and eventually reaching a 
reduction of 1.4% in the short run and 2.7% in the long run. 
CONCLUSION 
Research by Basker and Noel (2009) has shown that competing grocers lower prices in 
response to competition from Walmart Supercenters.  We provide evidence of very different 
responses to competition from warehouse clubs.  Using a panel of cities from the ACCRA COLI 
and a dynamic fixed effects model, we find that Costco entry actually results in higher prices 
among incumbent grocers, while competition from Sam’s Club has no statistically detectable 
effect.  We conducted a variety of tests to increase our confidence that these relationships are 
causal, including a falsification test with non-grocery items; the addition of control variables, 
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city-specific time trends, and leads of store presence; and the consideration of an instrumental 
variables strategy.  We also examined heterogeneity on the bases of product type, order of store 
entry, and market population and grocery store density.  Costco’s effect is strongest for items for 
which the brand is not specified, and in sparsely populated cities with competitive grocery 
markets. 
Our results are consistent with work by Ellickson (2004, 2007) showing that firms 
compete on the basis of quality.  They also illustrate how firms’ entrepreneurial and managerial 
decisions are multi-dimensional.  Grocery stores may elect not to compete with deep-discount 
membership warehouses on the price dimension, instead focusing on the less price-sensitive 
consumers and providing a higher quality shopping experience, higher-end products, or greater 
convenience. 
More broadly, our work shows that not all big box chains are created equal.  The big 
box retail literature has focused almost exclusively on Walmart, examining its effects on a wide 
range of outcomes including prices, labor market outcomes, small business activity, time use, 
obesity, and social and cultural indicators.  Our finding that Costco and Sam’s Club have very 
different effects on competitors’ prices than Walmart Supercenters point to the need for future 
research to look beyond Walmart when examining how the proliferation of big box retailers in 
recent decades has impacted communities.  
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Table 1 – Costco and Sam's Club Sales By Category, 2009 
 
Costco Sam's Club 
Sundries 23% 37% 
Hardlines 19% 16% 
Softlines 10% 5% 
Food 33% 30% 
Services/Anciliary 15% 12% 
Sources: Wal-Mart Stores 2009 10-K, p. 10; Costco 2009 Annual Report, p. 9. 
Notes: Reports offer slightly different definitions of categories and use slightly 
different terminology.  Costco food sales is the sum of "food" and "fresh food" 
percentages. 
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Table 2 – Grocery Item Prices (in 2006 dollars) 
 
Category Variable Description Mean (Std. Dev.) 
All Items Pooled 2.371 (1.748) 
Starches Bread Per oz, white bread 1.130 (0.230) 
Cereal 18 oz box of corn flakes; Kellogg’s or Post 3.162 (0.540) 
 
 
Fruits and 
Vegetables 
Lettuce Head of iceberg 1.283 (0.222) 
Bananas Per lb 0.593 (0.111) 
Potatoes 10 lb sack 3.386 (0.910) 
Peas 15 oz can, sweet; Del Monte or Green Giant 0.858 (0.148) 
Peaches 29 oz halves or slices; Hunts, Del Monte, or 
Libby’s 
1.957 (0.220) 
Corn 16 oz whole kernel frozen 1.326 (0.238) 
 
 
 
Meats 
Steak Per lb, t-bone 7.986 (1.284) 
Beef Per lb, ground 2.060 (0.475) 
Chicken Per lb, whole uncut 1.164 (0.204) 
Sausage 1 lb. package; Jimmy Dean or Owen 3.829 (0.697) 
Eggs Dozen large, grade A or AA  1.196 (0.305) 
Tuna 6 oz chunk of light tuna; Starkist or Chicken of 
the Sea 
0.859 (0.166) 
 
 
Beverages 
Coffee 11.5 oz can; Maxwell House, Hills Brothers, or 
Folgers 
3.588 (0.840) 
Soft Drink 2 liter bottle; Coca Cola 1.437 (0.214) 
Milk Half-gallon, whole 2.068 (0.259) 
 
Additives 
Sugar 4 lb cane or beat 1.940 (0.253) 
Shortening 3 lb can; Crisco 3.691 (0.426) 
Parmesan 8 oz canister of grated parmesan cheese; Kraft 4.346 (0.675) 
Margarine 1 lb sticks, Blue Bonnet or Parkay 0.913 (0.207) 
 
Non-Foods 
Tissue Box of 175; Kleenex 1.607 (0.225) 
Detergent 75 oz dishwashing powder; Cascade 4.161 (0.808) 
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Table 3 – Non-Grocery Item Prices (in 2006 dollars) 
 
Variable  Description Mean (Std. Dev.) 
All Items Pooled 18.367 (14.790) 
Phone Private residential line, basic monthly rate, fees and taxes 26.573 (4.742) 
Tire Balance Average price to computer or spin balance, one front 
wheel 
9.450 (1.414) 
Haircut Men’s barber shop haircut, no styling 11.880 (2.029) 
Salon Woman's shampoo, trim, and blow dry 29.137 (6.281) 
Dry Cleaning Man's two-piece suit 9.402 (1.362) 
Washer Home service call, clothes washing machine; minimum 
labor charge, excluding parts 
51.256 (8.957) 
Newspaper Daily and Sunday home delivery, large-city newspaper, 
monthly rate 
16.191 (3.712) 
Movie First-run, indoor, evening, no discount 8.110 (0.870) 
Bowling Price per line (game), Saturday evening non-league rate 3.324 (0.667) 
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Table 4 – Store, Distribution Center, and Control Variables 
 
Variable Description Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Costcos Number of Costcos in the city 0.183 (0.509) 
 Costcos per 100,000 residents in the city 0.127 (0.557) 
 Costcos per 100 square miles in the city 0.355 (1.598) 
 Binary variable for any Costcos in the city 0.143 (0.350) 
 Number of Costcos in the county 0.367 (1.344) 
Sam’s Clubs Number of Sam’s Clubs in the city 0.706 (0.965) 
 Sam’s Clubs in the per 100,000 residents in the city 0.608 (0.884) 
 Sam’s Clubs per 100 square miles in the city 1.254 (2.035) 
 Binary variable for any Sam’s Clubs in the city 0.529 (0.499) 
 Number of Sam’s Clubs in the county 0.932 (1.333) 
Supercenters Number of Walmart Supercenters in the city 0.730 (1.119) 
 Supercenters per 100,000 residents in the city 1.041 (1.835) 
 Supercenters per 100 square miles in the city 1.790 (3.194) 
 Binary variable for any Supercenters in the city 0.447 (0.497) 
 Number of Supercenters in the county 1.073 (1.845) 
Discount Stores Number of Walmart discount stores in the city 0.923 (1.200) 
Costco DC Miles to nearest Costco distribution center 499.817 (334.292) 
Sam’s DC Miles to nearest Sam’s Club distribution center 260.890 (184.949) 
Supercenter DC Miles to nearest Walmart food distribution center 297.910 (319.851) 
Population City population (units of 100,000) 2.253 (6.335) 
Land City land area (units of 100 square miles) 104.505 (192.651) 
Income City median household income (units of 10,000) 3.469 (0.672) 
Grocery Stores Number of grocery stores in the county 77.152 (173.277) 
Warehouse 
clubs/supercenters 
Number of warehouse clubs or supercenters in the 
county (after subtracting Costcos, Sam’s Clubs, and 
Walmart Supercenters)  
0.943 (1.970) 
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Table 5 – Baseline Results and Falsification Test 
 
  Effect on Grocery Prices Effect on Non-Grocery 
Prices 
Costcos Short-Run Effect 0.014 (0.004)*** 0.004 (0.003) 
 
Long-Run Effect 0.027 (0.008)*** 0.011 (0.008) 
Sam’s Clubs Short-Run Effect 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 
 
Long-Run Effect 0.006 (0.007) 0.010 (0.012) 
Supercenters Short-Run Effect -0.009 (0.001)*** -0.0007 (0.001) 
 
Long-Run Effect -0.017 (0.003)*** -0.002 (0.004) 
Lagged Price  0.472 (0.009)*** 0.636 (0.013)*** 
Observations  70604 27657 
Notes: Standard errors, which are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by city, are in parentheses.  *** indicates 
statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.  The “short-run effects” are the coefficient 
estimates for the store variables; the “long-run effects” are the coefficient estimates for the store variables divided by 
one minus the coefficient estimate for lagged price.  All regressions include product*year and city fixed effects. 
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Table 6 – Robustness Checks 
 
  Costcos  Sam’s Clubs  Supercenters 
  Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run 
Panel A: 
Add 
Controls 
Population*year 0.012*** 0.023***  0.003 0.006  -0.009*** -0.017*** 
Income*year 0.012*** 0.023***  0.003 0.007  -0.009*** -0.017*** 
Additional stores 0.013*** 0.025***  0.004 0.008  -0.009*** -0.017*** 
Linear city trends 0.014* 0.025*  -0.006 -0.010  -0.010*** -0.018*** 
Panel B: 
Alternate 
Store 
Variables 
Per 100,000 capita 0.008*** 0.015***  -0.0002 -0.0004  -0.006*** -0.011*** 
Per 100 square miles 0.008** 0.015**  0.004 0.007  -0.007*** -0.014*** 
Binary 0.009 0.016  0.006 0.011  -0.021*** -0.041*** 
County-level 0.009*** 0.017***  0.008*** 0.014***  -0.006*** -0.011*** 
County-level; add county trends 0.009* 0.017*  -0.002 -0.003  -0.006*** -0.012*** 
Panel C: 
Alternate 
Samples 
Balanced panel (n=26519) 0.011 0.022  -0.0001 -0.0002  -0.007*** -0.014*** 
Single cities only (n=60628) 0.012** 0.022**  0.005 0.010  -0.009*** -0.016*** 
1st quarter (n=69276) 0.011*** 0.020***  0.007 0.013  0.011*** -0.017*** 
Basket; simple average (n=3061) 0.013*** 0.023***  0.005 0.008  -0.009*** -0.014*** 
Basket; weighted average (n=3061) 0.013*** 0.022***  0.004 0.006  -0.008*** -0.014*** 
Panel D: 
Longer 
Lags of 
Price  
Price in t-2 0.018*** 0.029***  0.004 0.007  -0.012*** -0.019*** 
Price in t-3 0.017*** 0.027***  0.006 0.009  -0.013*** -0.020*** 
Price in t-4 0.017*** 0.025***  0.007 0.010  -0.015*** -0.021*** 
No lagged price 0.025*** 0.025***  0.009 0.009  -0.014*** -0.014*** 
Panel E: 
IV 
Baseline 0.038*** 
[7.63] 
0.080*** 
 
0.013 
[14.48] 
0.028 
 
-0.059*** 
[16.45] 
-0.124*** 
Add population, density, and 
income 
0.034** 
[7.72] 
0.071**  0.003 
[11.46] 
0.006  -0.043** 
[4.93] 
-0.089** 
All regressions include product x year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and lagged price.  In Panel E, the first stage F statistics are in brackets.  Standard errors are 
suppressed to save space; they are available upon request.  See other notes for Table 5. 
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Table 7 – Lags 
  One Year Lag Two Year Lag Three Year Lag 
Costcos Coefficient Estimate 0.014 (0.007)** 0.013 (0.006)** 0.013 (0.006)** 
 
Coefficient Estimate for Lag -0.0001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) 
Sam’s Clubs Coefficient Estimate -0.003 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) 
 
Coefficient Estimate for Lag 0.008 (0.006) 0.008 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) 
Supercenters Coefficient Estimate -0.011 (0.003)*** -0.010 (0.002)*** -0.009 (0.002)*** 
 
Coefficient Estimate for Lag 0.002 (0.003) -0.0003 (0.002) -0.00004 (0.002) 
Lagged Price  0.467 (0.009)*** 0.460 (0.010)*** 0.456 (0.010)*** 
Observations  65662 60487 55038 
See notes for Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Leads 
  One Year Lead Two Year Lead Three Year Lead 
Costcos Coefficient Estimate 0.012 (0.006)* 0.015 (0.005)*** 0.017 (0.005)*** 
 
Coefficient Estimate for Lead 0.004 (0.005) -0.0006 (0.004) 0.0002 (0.004) 
Sam’s Clubs Coefficient Estimate -0.0006 (0.006) 0.0007 (0.004) 0.003 (0.005) 
 
Coefficient Estimate for Lead 0.005 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004)** 0.008 (0.004)** 
Supercenters Coefficient Estimate -0.006 (0.002)*** -0.008 (0.002)*** -0.011 (0.002)*** 
 
Coefficient Estimate for Lead -0.003 (0.002)* -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
Lagged Price  0.472 (0.009)*** 0.471 (0.009)*** 0.481 (0.009)*** 
Observations  70674 65798 60646 
See notes for Table 5. 
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Table 9– Product Categories 
 
  Costcos  Sam’s Clubs  Supercenters 
  Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run 
Starches (n=6146)  0.011 0.018  0.010 0.016  -0.017*** -0.027*** 
Fruits/Vegetables (n=18438)  0.021*** 0.037***  0.007 0.012  -0.013*** -0.022*** 
Meats (n=18433)  0.016*** 0.028***  0.004 0.007  -0.009*** -0.015*** 
Drinks (n=9219)  0.017*** 0.034***  0.002 0.004  -0.006*** -0.011*** 
Additives (n=12292)  0.010* 0.017*  -0.0007 -0.001  -0.007*** -0.012*** 
Non-Food Items (n=6146)  0.008 0.010  0.004 0.006  -0.008*** -0.011*** 
Brand Specified (n=36871)  0.013*** 0.023***  0.004 0.007  -0.008*** -0.015*** 
Brand Not Specified (n=33803)  0.017*** 0.031***  0.003 0.006  -0.011*** -0.019*** 
All regressions include product x year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and lagged price.  Standard errors are suppressed to save space; they are available upon 
request.  See other notes for Table 5. 
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Table 10 – Individual Products 
 
 Costcos  Sam’s Clubs  Supercenters 
 Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run 
Bread 0.007 0.008  0.012 0.015  -0.023*** -0.028*** 
Cereal 0.021 0.028  0.017 0.023  -0.018*** -0.024*** 
Lettuce 0.060*** 0.066***  0.007 0.008  -0.017*** -0.026*** 
Bananas 0.012 0.013  0.008 0.008  -0.017*** -0.018*** 
Potatoes 0.018 0.019  0.048*** 0.050***  -0.020*** -0.020*** 
Peas 0.032** 0.038**  0.012 0.014**  -0.017*** 0.020*** 
Peaches 0.013 0.018  0.011 0.016  -0.005* -0.007* 
Corn 0.040*** 0.049***  -0.011 -0.013  -0.022*** -0.027*** 
Steak 0.018 0.020  0.001 0.001  -0.009** -0.010** 
Beef 0.025* 0.028*  0.035** 0.040***  -0.012** -0.013** 
Chicken 0.024 0.027  -0.006 -0.007  -0.013*** -0.015*** 
Sausage 0.017 0.018  0.008 0.009  -0.013*** -0.014*** 
Eggs 0.035** 0.038**  0.007 0.007  -0.018*** -0.019*** 
Tuna 0.027** 0.032**  0.003 0.004  -0.012*** -0.014*** 
Coffee 0.026** 0.031**  -0.006 -0.007  -0.009*** -0.011*** 
Soft Drink 0.027** 0.033**  0.012 0.015  -0.008** -0.010** 
Milk 0.016** 0.023**  0.009 0.013**  -0.007** -0.009** 
Sugar 0.017* 0.019*  -0.004 -0.004*  -0.006* -0.006* 
Shortening 0.011 0.020  -0.011** -0.019**  -0.004* -0.006* 
Parmesan 0.019** 0.029**  0.008 0.011  -0.009*** -0.013*** 
Margarine -0.003 -0.003  0.013 0.016  -0.016*** -0.019*** 
Tissue 0.001 0.002  0.011 0.013  -0.008*** -0.010*** 
Detergent 0.015* 0.019*  -0.00007 -0.00008  -0.009*** -0.011*** 
All regressions have a sample size of 3073, except for sausage for which five observations are missing.  All 
regressions include lagged price, product x year fixed effects, and city fixed effects.  See other notes for Table 5. 
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Table 11 – Heterogeneity by Order of Store 
 
 Costcos  Sam’s Clubs  Supercenters 
 Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run  Short-Run Long-Run 
1st Store 0.012** 0.023**  0.008* 0.015  -0.013*** -0.025*** 
2nd Store 0.013** 0.026**  0.004 0.008  -0.011*** -0.021*** 
3rd Store 0.015* 0.029*  0.0003 0.0006  -0.009*** -0.017*** 
4th Store 0.017 0.031  -0.003 0.006  -0.006*** -0.012*** 
Estimates computed from regressions of ln(Price) on the number of stores and their squares, controlling for lagged 
price, product x year fixed effects, and city fixed effects.  Standard errors are suppressed to save space; they are 
available upon request.  See other notes for Table 5.  Coefficient estimates (standard errors) for the store variables: 
Costco 0.012 (0.007), Costco2 0.0007 (0.002), Sam’s 0.010 (0.004), Sam’s2 -0.002 (0.0005), Supercenters -0.015 
(0.002), Supercenters2 0.001 (0.0003). 
 
 
42 
 
Figure 1 – Marginal Effect of Costcos on ln(Price) by Population 
 
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Costcos 0.015 (0.007), Costcos*population -0.0018 (0.0015), Costcos*population2 0.00006 (0.00004).     
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Figure 2 – Marginal Effect of Sam’s Clubs on ln(Price) by Population 
 
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Sam’s 0.001 (0.006), Sam’s*population 0.002 (0.002), Sam’s*population2 -0.0001 (0.0001). 
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Figure 3 – Marginal Effect of Walmart Supercenters on ln(Price) by Population 
 
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Supercenters -0.013 (0.002), Supercenters*population 0.0015 (0.0007), Supercenters*population2 -0.00006 (0.00004). 
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Figure 4 – Marginal Effect of Costcos on ln(Price) by Grocery Store Density 
 
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Costcos 0.004 (0.008), Costcos*stores 0.0002 (0.0002), Costcos*stores2 -8.27e-7 (6.70e-7).     
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Figure 5 – Marginal Effect of Sam’s Clubs on ln(Price) by Grocery Store Density 
 
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Sam’s -0.003 (0.006), Sam’s*stores 0.0002 (0.0001), Sam’s*stores2 -3.70e-7 (6.88e-7). 
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Figure 6 – Marginal Effect of Walmart Supercenters on ln(Price) by Grocery Store Density 
 
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Supercenters -0.005 (0.003), Supercenters*stores -0.0001 (0.00007), Supercenters*stores2 -4.70e-7 (2.61e-7). 
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